Are temporary jobs a port of entry into permanent employment? In this paper we argue that the answer crucially depends on the type of temporary contracts being considered, as the di¤erent contracts observed in practice are typically characterized by varying combinations of training, tax-incentives and EPL provisions. We base our empirical evidence on a longitudinal sample of labour market entrants in Italy, a country where a large number of temporary contracts coexist with a relatively high employment protection for standard employees. We estimate dynamic multinomial logit models with …xed e¤ects, to allow for non-random sorting of workers into the di¤erent types of contracts. We show that the transition to permanent employment is more likely for individuals holding any type of temporary contracts than for the unemployed, thus broadly con…rming the existence of port-of-entry e¤ects. Yet, not all temporary contracts are the same: training contracts are the best port of entry, while freelance contracts are the worst. We also show that temporary contracts are generally a port-of-entry into a permanent position within the same employer, but not across …rms, implying that little general-purpose training is gained while on temporary jobs. Moreover, the time needed for an internal transformation from a temporary to a permanent position appears rather long, suggesting that …rms are likely to use (a sequence of) temporary contracts as a cost-reduction strategy, rather than as a screening device for newly hired workers.
Introduction
The liberalization of temporary contracts has been the main labour market policy in Europe in the last two decades, with the stated objective of increasing labour market ‡exibility. In many countries temporary contracts make up the bulk of new hires, for instance over 90% in Spain (Dolado et al., 2002) and over 50% in Italy, as we document below. In 2008 the contracts of limited duration represented 14.7% of the employed workforce in the EU25, up from a share of 11.7% in 1997 (Eurostat data).
Several reasons stand behind these developments. From the employers perspective, the availability of temporary jobs is tantamount to a reduction in …ring costs, which is particularly valuable in an environment with incomplete information and high employment protection for standard jobs (Bentolila and Bertola, 1990 ; Bertola, 1990; Booth, 1997) . Temporary jobs can be attractive from the labour supply standpoint too: they may allow a reduction of the unemployment duration and contribute to a decline in the unemployment rates of the weakest segments of the labour force (e.g. Alonso-Borrego et al. ). Furthermore, concerns have been expressed that people in such ‡exible working arrangements may be trapped into precarious career paths increasing the risks of social exclusion (e.g., D'Addio and Rosholm, 2005) . At the extreme, temporary jobs may simply provide disadvantaged unemployed individuals with a valuable income-generating opportunity, but without signi…cantly enhancing their human capital, social network and future employability, as in the case of the French temporary jobs considered by Magnac (2000) .
One of the main questions surrounding the introduction and liberalization of temporary workers -and the one that we aim at answering in this paper -is therefore whether they ultimately represent a port of entry to open-ended jobs. We contribute to the existing empirical literature in two main ways. First, we show that the answer to this question crucially depends on the type of temporary contract being considered (e.g. …xed term, training, apprenticeship, freelance). This is because the di¤erent contracts observed in practice are typically characterized by varying combinations of training, tax-incentives for …rms and EPL provisions, implying that some "contract packages" are more e¤ective in providing port-of-entry mechanisms for workers while others just increase the ‡exibility of …rms' workforce. A disaggregated analysis of the main types of temporary contracts can help us understand the role that temporary jobs can have in a¤ecting a worker's career. From a policy perspective, it can also contribute to illuminate discussions on how to shape temporary work legislation. In fact, in most EU Countries …xed term, training, apprenticeship and freelance contracts are available in addition to open ended ones. However, despite the EU has tried to give its members a common legislative framework for the use of temporary contracts (e.g. the directive 1999/70), many di¤erences still persist in their actual phrasing (e.g., ILO, 2003 ; OECD, 2000; Bassanini et al., 2005 , Bertolini et al, 2008 . Most of the existing empirical literature, however, aggregates temporary contracts in a single category, thereby ignoring a relevant source of heterogeneity.
Second, we show that much can be learned on temporary contracts by distinguishing between transitions occurring within the same …rm (e.g. a transformation from a temporary to a permanent contract) and those happening between di¤erent …rms, with or without any intervening spell of unemployment. The distinction -often neglected in the existing literature due to lack of suitable data -can provide evidence on the ability of temporary jobs to increase workers' general versus …rm-speci…c human capital. It can also inform on the reasons employers o¤er temporary contracts to newly hired workers.
To make our points, we use a longitudinal matched employer-employee database drawn from WHIP, the Work Histories Italian Panel. This dataset has several advantages for studying empirically the port-of-entry hypothesis. First, we are able to observe the detailed labour market history of a large number of young workers, over 6000 individuals, since they enter their …rst employment spell and for a long time period (from 1998 to 2004). In particular, the data record each individual's transitions between seven labour market states following entry: four di¤erent types of temporary contracts (namely, …xed-term contracts; training contracts; apprenticeship; freelance work), open-ended contracts, selfemployment and non-employment. Second, given the large sample size, we can a¤ord to look only at labour market entrants, thereby circumventing any initial condition problem that often plague the econometric analyses of labour market transitions. Third, because we use register data (as opposed to survey data), we can avoid sample selectivity problems related to non-random attrition or nonresponse. Moreover, the observed transitions are not a¤ected by recall biases and other measurement errors are likely to be minimal. Forth, because of the matched employer-employee nature, we are able to observe whether the worker is employed in the same …rm in two di¤erent points in time, with the same or with a di¤erent contract; i.e. we can distinguish between job changes across …rms and contract transformations within the same …rm.
To test the port of entry hypothesis, we estimate dynamic multinomial logit models with …xed e¤ects, to allow for non-random sorting of workers into the different types of contracts. These models aim at estimating how past employment status (e.g., training contract) a¤ect the chances of transiting towards any of the other states (e.g. …xed term contract, or non employment). Here the main econometric challenge is to disentangle the causal e¤ect of past employment states from spurious selection due to unobserved individual characteristics. By allowing for individual …xed e¤ects, our models are well placed for dealing with this challenge. In addition, the models turned out to be tractable even when transitions between as many as seven labour market states were considered, which was crucial given our aims. While the Markovian assumption embedded in these models imply that the dynamics of the process is kept relatively simple, the crucial advantage is that the estimates of transition parameters are robust to any speci…cation of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity (Magnac, 2000) .
Our main results are as follows. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we show that the transition to permanent employment is more likely for individuals holding any type of temporary contracts than for the unemployed, thus broadly con…rming the existence of port-of-entry e¤ects. Yet, not all temporary contracts are the same. Training contracts are the best port of entry; they provide formal training alongside a lower labour cost and non negligible EPL provisions. Freelance contracts are the worst; they have no EPL provisions, no training and low labour cost. We also show that temporary contracts are generally a port-of-entry into a permanent position within the same …rm, but not across …rms (none of them), implying that little general-purpose training is gained while on temporary jobs. Moreover, the time needed for an internal transformation from a temporary to a permanent position appears rather long, suggesting that …rms are likely to use (a sequence of) …xed term and training contracts as a cost-reduction strategy, rather than as a screening device for newly hired workers. The only condition that increases the probability of getting an open ended contract in a new …rm is having had a long employment spell with an open ended contract in the current …rm.
Our paper is related to a number of recent empirical contributions testing the port-of-entry hypothesis of temporary contracts. for France instead …nd little evidence of port of entry e¤ects. As for Italy, the evidence is mixed. Gagliarducci (2005) uses retrospective survey data and shows that the probability of obtaining an open ended job grows with the duration of the current spell in temporary employment, but decreases with the number of past temporary spells. His multi-state multi-spell duration analysis allows for a rich dynamics and for random unobserved heterogeneity, but computational tractability requires that the analysis be con…ned to only three, highly aggregated, labour market states. The same aggregation is used by Picchio (2008) who …nds evidence of port-of-entry in a di¤erent survey dataset. Ichino et al. (2008) instead focus on one speci…c type of temporary contracts -agency contracts -and …nd that they act as a port of entry in Tuscany but not in Sicily. By showing that the existence of the port of entry hypothesis is intimately linked to the type of temporary contracts being considered, as well as to whether transitions are observed between or within …rms, our results intend to add to this strand of the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 reviews the theoretical reasons for the di¤erent forms of state dependence, while section 3 presents our econometric approach. Section 4 presents the data. Sections 5 and 6, respectively, discuss the descriptive evidence and the econometric estimates. Section 7 draws the main conclusions and the appendix brie ‡y depicts the institutional framework.
The theoretical framework
A number of reasons emerge in the literature to explain why temporary jobs may act as a port of entry into open ended employment, which may occur both within the same …rm -i.e., the temporary contract is converted into an open ended one -or between …rms, with or without an intervening spell of unemployment.
Within the same …rm, temporary jobs can be used as a screening device. Since ability cannot be perfectly observed, employers often decide to post temporary vacancies in order to screen the workers, and to retain with an open ended contract only the ones who proved to be more productive. To assess the relevance of a screening device argument, the analyst is required to have information relative to the length of the learning process about the …rm-worker match quality, so as to determine whether a worker's permanence in a given …rm with a temporary contract is justi…ed by a "normal" screening process. To the best of our knowledge no such measure is available in the literature. 1 Temporary work in one …rm may also be a port of entry to open ended employment in another …rm. This is more likely to occur if temporary workers receive general purpose training in their current job, as this would increase their human capital with respect to unemployed individuals. Even if no training is provided, temporary jobs may allow the worker to build a network of contacts that in turn may increase open ended employment opportunities.
But temporary jobs may also become a trap. On the one hand, when the mechanisms leading to the port of entry are not activated during a temporary contract, the latter will eventually result in either unemployment or successive spells of temporary work. This may lead to human capital depreciation and a deterioration of the future prospects of getting a permanent job, representing one case of true "scarring e¤ect" of temporary work.
On the other hand, the literature points to individual heterogeneity as a mechanism sorting individuals into di¤erent contracts, thereby explaining some or all of the observed state dependence. Worker heterogeneity may be present in the budget constraint, i.e. some individuals searching in the labour market may face liquidity constraints. Despite possibly being high productivity workers, they may rationally choose a temporary job because more protected positions are not quickly, available. Therefore the individuals with a more stringent budget constraint -who need to earn a wage as soon as possible -sort into …xed term contracts (Alonso-Borrego et al., 2005; Berton and Garibaldi, 2006 ). In such cases, persistence in temporary contracts is due to a possibly unobservable (to the econometrician) confounding factor, and it should fade as soon as the constraint relaxes.
Persistence in temporary contracts may also arise as a result of employers' behaviour in the face of heterogeneity in the …rm-worker match quality. As pointed out by Güell and Petrongolo (2007) , even in the presence of perfectly observable worker types, …rms may use temporary contracts simply because they are a cheaper and more ‡exible factor of production. In this case, …rms are trading o¤ lower labour costs with a higher quit rate and the risk of losing productive matches, as temporary workers are more likely to quit in order to accept a better match with respect to permanent workers. Using a partial equilibrium search and matching model, they show under what conditions temporary contracts (i) are never converted to permanent contracts, (ii) are converted before their legal limit, (iii) are converted only at the end of the legal limit. It turns out that temporary contracts that are never converted could coexist with both early and late conversions. In particular, both a lower match productivity and less favorable worker's outside options, which make a worker's quit threat less credible, reduce the probability of contract conversion.
When individual ability is not perfectly observable by new prospective employers there is also room for statistical discrimination. 2 At least three mechanisms may induce employers to believe that former temporary workers are less productive: i) on the previous job they received less training and had themselves a lower incentive to invest in human capital (a sort of self ful…lling prophecy); ii) the previous employer hired them on a temporary arrangement just to face a demand upturn, but retention was unpro…table due to their low productivity; iii) they failed the screening period proving to be of lower ability. Employers are therefore prone to o¤er them another temporary position. In this case persistence in temporary jobs is not due to some (observable or not) individual characteristic, but to past temporary jobs themselves, leading to a second case of true scarring e¤ect.
As Dolado et al. (2002) point out, there is currently no theoretical approach that is able to contemplate all these mechanisms at once; moreover, in the real world they are likely to overlap. A fully structural model is beyond the scope of the present work; we instead estimate a reduced form model, where we control for the role of individual heterogeneity (unobserved to the econometrician, but observed by the match parties) as well as possible; any remaining e¤ects will be interpreted in the light of what has been discussed above. In particular, a high probability to move from a temporary to an open ended position within the same …rm would support the hypothesis of temporary contracts as a screening device, provided that the length of the temporary contract is not exceedingly long. A transition from a temporary contract to an open ended position held in a di¤erent …rm will instead be interpreted as evidence for a more general port of entry hypothesis, e.g. temporary jobs allow workers to gain general purpose human capital. Persistence in temporary jobs will be interpreted as a true scarring e¤ect of past temporary work when emerging from transitions across …rms; when emerging within the …rm it would support the idea of cost reduction behaviour by the employers. From this perspective, the possibility of observing transitions between di¤erent types of contracts -i.e. di¤erent mixtures of labour cost, EPL, and training -constitute a crucial source of variation for disentangling the various mechanisms at work.
The econometric strategy
We are interested in dynamic models in which a high number of labour market states can be taken into account and it is possible to disentangle the e¤ect of individual heterogeneity from the e¤ect of past labour market experiences. In this respect, a trade o¤ is faced when choosing the appropriate econometric model. On the one hand, continuous time models (e.g., the event-history analysis used by Bonnal et al., 1997 and Gagliarducci, 2005) are in general more careful about the dynamics of the process and less on controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, which is often described as a random e¤ect that multiplicatively enters a proportional hazard. On the other hand, multi-state models in discrete time allow the introduction of unobserved …xed e¤ects, possibly correlated with other individual characteristics, and without the need to resort to distributional assumptions, but at the cost of a poorer dynamic speci…cation: usually, a Markov chain. Since our two main concerns are in ‡exibly controlling for unobserved heterogeneity while maintaining a high disaggregation of the labour market states, we follow the second strategy and use the approach proposed by Magnac (2000) . 3 The model reads as follows: for each individual i 2 f1; :::; N g the latent propensity level y ijt to be in state j 2 f0; :::; Kg at time t 2 f2; :::; T g is a function of the lagged state variables and of unobserved heterogeneity ijt
where 1[ ] is an indicator function and kj are the parameters of interest. The unobserved components ijt are decomposed into an individual and state speci…c e¤ect ij and residuals u ijt . Observed states are the states with maximum propensity
If the residual components u ijt , conditional on ij , are extreme value distributed and independent across states, individuals and periods, the probability to be in state j at time t for individual i given that she was in state k in the previous period, reads
Identi…cation of the state dependence parameters kj requires a normalization constraint, namely to set to zero the parameters related to one of the destination states, here j = 0: Therefore, i0 = 0 and k0 = 0, for any k. The interpretation of the kj is easier once the following ratio is considered, independent of the individual and state speci…c e¤ect ij :
The state parameters kj are identi…ed once the additional normalization 0j = 0, for any j, is imposed. The interpretation is as follows: if kj is positive, the odds of being in state j with respect to state 0 when the lagged state is k are larger than when the lagged state is 0.
Choosing "non work" as the reference state, the estimated kj are informative of the nature of state dependence found in the data, i.e. whether a port of entry or a trap-e¤ect dominates for the di¤erent types of contracts considered. If a trap-e¤ect holds, the estimated transition parameters are larger when the lagged and the current states are equal than when they di¤er, i.e. kk > kj , for any j 6 = k. In principle, this type of state dependence does not exclude a port of entry e¤ect, i.e. k;j=1 > 0, where j = 1 denotes open ended employment. In this case, the positive state parameter k;j=1 means that getting an open ended contract as the destination state is easier if the current state is k (say any of the temporary contracts) instead of non work. Finally k;j=1 > h;j=1 implies that contract k provides a better port of entry with respect to contract h.
Estimation uses a conditional maximum likelihood method (CML). As shown by Magnac, the individual likelihood contribution is
Pr fy i2 ; :::; y iT 1 jy i1 ; Y i1 ; :::; Y iK ; y iT g = exp P k>0
where
is the number of occurrences of state k for individual i from time 2 to T 1 and B = b = (y i2 ; :::; y iT 1 )j8k > 0;
is the set of all the possible state sequences that are compatible with the number of occurrences of each state. This method compares the work histories that are equivalent in terms of the number of occurrences but di¤er for the sequence of the states. The variability between time 2 and T 1 is informative about the transitions among states; for this reason, stable histories do not enter the likelihood function and at least four periods must be observed. As we explain below, our speci…cation includes seven labour market states and up to seven yearly observations are used in the analysis.
Three considerations are in order before applying this econometric approach to our case. First, we do not explicitly account for initial conditions. This is viable, because our empirical analysis is based on a sample of entrants in the labour market (everybody is in the same state -non work -before their initial employment spell) and because controlling for individual …xed e¤ects we control for the initial endowment of human capital and ability. Second, the model proposed by Magnac works out the problem of unobserved heterogeneity in a very elegant way without any distributional assumption. Nonetheless, it's not able to take into account the e¤ect of time varying covariates. In other words, the state dependence we observe after controlling for …xed e¤ects could be due to some individual characteristics that vary in the time interval we observe. 4 One obvious candidate is human capital, that is expected to increase more in open ended and in training contracts. However, no obvious candidates emerge once we control for the contract type, and hence indirectly for the possibly di¤erent rate of accumulation of human capital.
Finally, persistence within a contract can in fact be due to an ongoing screening process on the match quality -as argued in section 2 -instead of being due to a true "scarring e¤ect" of past temporary work. Since in this case the main issue is the length of the screening period, one way to at least partially control for this fact is to look at transitions over increasing time intervals: we do this by estimating the model at one year and at two year intervals. To single out further the two mechanisms, we next control for the fact that the worker is employed with the same contract in two points in time in the same …rm or in a di¤erent …rm. Hence we separate transitions not only between/within contracts but also between/within …rms as a further set of labour market states. The length of the screening process is unobservable; however, if persistence with a temporary contract within the same …rm is "very long" (e.g. four years), this can be interpreted as indication of a cost reducing behaviour on the part of the …rm.
The data
To perform our empirical analysis we use WHIP (the Work Histories Italian Panel), a large work histories dataset built up by LABORatorio R. Revelli from the Italian social security administration archives 5 . This choice allows:
to observe many di¤erent contracts, i.e. many di¤erent "bundles" of Employment Protection provisions, Social Security Contributions and formal training content: open-ended contract, …xed-term contract 6 , training contract, apprenticeship, freelance work 7 and self-employment, whose char- 4 Along the lines of Magnac, Honorè and Kyriazidou (2000) propose a solution to this problem. However, the conditions for the identi…cation of the coe¢ cients of time-varying characterisitcs -i.e. x(t) should be almost constant when the state changes -are too datademanding to be reasonable in our context. 5 Full details on the data can be found at www.laboratoriorevelli.itnwhip 6 Agency contracts represent only 0.3% of labor market entrants and for tractability are included among …xed-term contracts. See Heyway et al. (2006) for a recent analysis of the determinants of agency contracts. 7 A freelance worker is formally self-employed, hence she enjoys a minimal level of social pro-acteristics are summarized in Table 1. 8 to select a ‡ow sample of entrants in employment and follow them for a long span of time, namely the …rst seven years of their working careers, yet remaining with a large sample size (more than 6000 individual work histories). To be more speci…c, we select native people under 40 years of age never observed in employment between 1985 and 1997 that start their …rst paid job during 1998; we then follow them until the end of 2004. In this way we circumvent the initial condition bias that often a¤ects the analysis of labor market transitions: the initial state, indeed, will be nonemployment for everyone in the sample;
for dependent employees, to distinguish between contract transformation within the same …rm and proper labor market transitions across di¤erent employers, i.e. contract and …rm code are two di¤erent pieces of information, both recorded on a monthly base.
Notice that WHIP's reference population excludes only civil servants hired on an open ended contract, high skill professions (e.g. lawyers) and workers in the black economy, by de…nition. Hence, we exclude from the analysis those who work with a …xed term contract in the public sector, as their eventual transition to an open ended contract in the same public sector would be unobservable. In this setting, absences from the archive can be easily labelled "non work" spells, as transitions back and forth to non observed contracts (mainly a permanent position in the public sector, or a high skill profession) are extremely unlikely 9 . As our econometric approach models transitions across states as a Markov chain, we record the entry contract as well as the labour market position of the workers in October of every year from 1998 to 2004. Since identi…cation tection, but in many cases her income depends on only one contractor and her tasks are equal to those performed by dependent employees. They are often labelled "quasi-subordinate" workers. The appendix provides further details on the institutional framework. See also Bertolini et al. (2008) . 8 Our analysis does not distinguish between part time and full time jobs. Robustness checks showed that the exclusion of part time jobs is inconsequential on our results. 9 Unemployment bene…t recipients are included in the "non work" state, as inevitably are also employment spells in the black economy. requires a minimum of four observations for each individual, the series allows the estimation at one as well as at two-year intervals.
The next section provides descriptive evidence on both the entry contract and transition probabilities. We then move to the estimates.
Descriptive evidence
We observe 6096 individuals aged 15 to 39 in 1998; about 46% of them are women. Table 2 details the entry contract shares in 1998: 33% of individuals start with an open ended contract, 27% as apprentice, about 10% start with each of the other contracts. Hence more than 56% of the individuals start their labour market career in a temporary contract.
Gender is a proxy for tastes and a relevant dimension of heterogeneity in general. Age at entry is a proxy for the initial endowment of ability (education, time spent looking for the …rst job). As table 2 shows, di¤erences by gender and age at entry are sizeable. Females are more likely than males to start their working career with a …xed term or freelance contract. Modal age at entry is between 20 and 24 years. Younger workers (15 -19 years old) enter mainly as apprentices. Individuals starting with a …xed term contract are younger than individuals starting with a training contract, while the other contracts and freelance ones in particular, are more often the entry contracts of more mature individuals. The share of open ended contracts as entry contract increases markedly as entry age increases. C o l u m n p e r c e n t a g e s . T o t a l : r o w p e r c e n t a g e s . Table 3 shows average transition rates in the raw data. The panels contain transitions at one, two, four and six year distance, respectively. In general individuals move to the same contract they had, to an open ended contract or to non work; all other transitions are quite rare. Persistence along the diagonal appears to be substantial.
Self employees display the largest persistence, with levels fading down slowly at increasing intervals. Persistence is high for open ended contract workers too, but it falls more rapidly. Open ended contract workers exhibit a growing transition rate to non work, con…rming that open ended contracts do not prevent the possibility of losing the job and are far from being an "absorbing state". Fixed term workers and free-lancers display lower and decreasing levels of persistence, that nonetheless does not completely disappear at larger intervals. Both types of contract su¤er from frequent exits to unemployment but enjoy increasing transition rates to open ended employment (and to …xed term contracts for the second group). 10 Training contracts have a legal maximum duration of 24 months, apprenticeship ones of 60 months (see the appendix): they both experience a growing transition rate to open ended jobs and a low possibility of exit to other contracts. The degree of persistence in training contracts completely fades away at longer intervals 11 , while declines less rapidly for apprentices. Persistence in non work decreases over time, but it is still at 24% after six years.
Focussing on the last panel of the table, six years after entry, we can observe the medium-long run outcome of these career paths conditional on their status in October 1998, the year in which they entered employment for the …rst time. are employed with a …xed term contract; they entered more often with a …xed term or with a freelance contract, or they were already out of work in October of the entry year. Self employed face the highest persistence in the contract and the lowest probabilities of moving to anything else, even to an open ended contract or out of work. This con…rms that self employment is a speci…c choice, a separate segment of the labour market, with little leakage to dependent employment. On the other hand, free-lancers move to dependent employment much more often than "true" self employees.
Finally, in table 4 we separate transitions of employees to the same or to a di¤erent …rm, at both 12 month (upper panel) and 24 month (lower panel) intervals. 12 As expected, the majority of open ended contract employees is employed in the same …rm 12 or 24 months later (mainly with the same contract: 59% and 78% at one year distance for short and long elapsed tenure respectively), although the share decreases the longer the interval considered (the previous …gures become 51% and 67%). Also …xed term contract workers show a high persistence within the same …rm: 25% of …xed term contract workers who have 1 0 The distinction between freelancers and a subset of self employees is based upon an "activity code" that is likely to su¤er from measurement errors. The transition intensity between the two states is therefore less reliable. 1 1 We observe a minimal number of training contracts lasting 25 months, possibly driving up the estimation of persistence at two year intervals; this is manly due to data construction reasons: starting and ending a 24-months contract during the same calendar month two years later is recorded as a 25-months spell in administrative data. 1 2 In the data …rm coding for freelancers is di¤erent from …rm coding for employees, so we cannot observe whether freelancers become employees in the same or in a di¤erent …rm. Moreover, note that this distinction is not meaningful for the self employed.
worked for a given …rm for at least 24 months are observed again within the same …rm after 24 more months under a …xed term contract (…fth column in the lower panel), while only 22% of them are observed within the same …rm after 24 more months with an open ended contract (column three). This is an example of a "very long" -at least 48 months -screening process.
Training contracts can last up to 24 months within the same …rm; if they are transformed into an open ended one before expiring the …rm retains the social security rebate till the original end of the training contract. Nonetheless, …rms seem to wait for the end of the contract to eventually transform it into an open ended one. In fact, of those who have spent less than one year as trainee in a …rm, more than half are still trainees in the same …rm after 12 more months (column seven in the upper panel), while only 13% are still working there with an open ended contract. After two years nobody can be still a trainee in the same …rm, and 52% of them are converted into an open ended contract (lower panel, third column, shorter tenure); another 21% has moved to a di¤erent …rm. Apprentices follow a similar pattern, i.e. the majority of them is still employed as apprentice in the same …rm at one year distance; almost 20% of longer tenure apprentices are promoted to an open ended contract instead; at two year distance 20% of them is still an apprentice in the same …rm, while about 40% have an open ended contract within the same …rm. For them an open ended contract with a di¤erent …rm is a less likely event (11% of long tenure apprentices, after 2 more years). Hence it seems that apprentices follow the pattern already observed for trainees, although with lower probabilities of transition.
In conclusion, it seems that workers face a quite long cursus honorum within the …rm before obtaining an open ended contract. However, the evidence depicted so far mixes up the e¤ects of heterogeneity, of genuine port of entry and of true scarring. In the next section we estimate the transition model and try to disentangle these components.
Econometric Results
In this section we present our CML estimates of kj at 12 as well as at 24 month intervals (in which case we exploit the minimum of four observations per individual required by Magnac's approach). The estimates are arranged in tables that show, for each kj , the origin state (k) by rows and the destination state (j) by columns. In other words, within each row one reads the odds of taking di¤erent contracts keeping the origin state constant; each column in turn displays the odds of taking one speci…c contract for di¤erent lagged conditions. Non work is taken as the reference state. Therefore positive (negative) …gures mean that the odds of taking contract j with respect to non work when the lagged state is k are larger (smaller) than when the lagged state is non work. Thus, if k 0 j > k 00 j the odds of taking contract j (with respect to non work) when the lagged state is k 0 are larger than when the lagged state is k 00 . Similarly, if kj 0 > kj 00 the odds of taking contract j 0 when the lagged state is k are larger than the odds of taking contract j 00 . First, we compare our CML estimates of kj , obtained after the individual …xed e¤ects have been eliminated, with simpler estimates of kj , call them d kj , obtained from a multinomial logit approach that only controls for the lagged state, i.e. without controlling for the individual …xed e¤ects. The CML estimates of kj are reported in table 6 for the one year transitions and in table  8 for the two year transitions. The corresponding d kj estimates are reported, respectively, in tables 5 and 7. This comparison is informative about individual heterogeneity: as long as it plays a role in sorting workers among di¤erent contracts, we expect the state dependence coe¢ cients to change after individual e¤ects ( ij ) are controlled for. In particular, we expect the coe¢ cients on the main diagonal to decrease, since the same individual characteristics that sort a worker into one contract are likely to further retain her there. Our …ndings support this hypothesis: persistence decreases substantially and signi…cantly after …xed e¤ects are controlled for, as it is immediately clear comparing the main diagonals in Table 5 and 6, and in Table 7 and 8.
Claim 1 Individual heterogeneity explains part of the observed persistence in the same contract. The e¤ ect is an overestimation.
Insights about the port of entry hypothesis are provided by the estimates reported under the column labelled "open ended" in tables 6 and 8. All the estimated k;j=1 are positive, for any k. Therefore, once individual …xed e¤ects are controlled for, open ended jobs are more easily accessible from employment than from non employment. This is true for every contract of origin but freelance work, whose port of entry e¤ect fades away before two years. An ordering among the contracts with respect to the probability of taking an open ended job emerges, with training contracts at the top, freelance work at the bottom and …xed term contracts outperforming apprenticeship ones. Training contracts display the highest coe¢ cient both at one and at two year distance, possibly implying a positive e¤ect of their formal training content. An e¤ect not so evident for apprentices, probably due to their longer maximum duration (5 years). Notice that Magnac (2000) …nds the opposite result: in France, training programmes are not more e¤ective than o¤-the-job search in …nding an open ended position. 13 Claim 2 The port of entry hypothesis holds; in particular, training contracts represent the best port of entry to open ended employment, freelance work the worst.
This notwithstanding, persistence is still far from fading away. Table 6 shows that for any given contract, the most likely destination state is the same contract, even after …xed e¤ects have been removed. At one year distance, each contract maximum stated duration might play a role: training and apprenticeship contracts, whose maximum legal durations are two and …ve years respectively, may be an example, but not free-lancers or …xed term contract workers, whose work relationships are shorter than one year on average. However, we expect persistence to decrease when computed at larger intervals. Table 8 shows that the coe¢ cients on the main diagonal actually decrease, but are still the row-speci…c highest …gures. Two aspects are worth a comment: i) persistence in open ended jobs falls dramatically at 24 months, con…rming that open ended contracts do not completely prevent a worker from losing her current job; ii) self employment is more likely to be a permanent choice of the worker; this induces the very high persistence and the very low transition coe¢ cients we read in the tables.
Claim 3
Retaining the same contract is always the most likely destination, at one as well as at two year intervals, even after individual e¤ ects are controlled for.
Finally, we estimate the model separating movements within the same …rm or toward a di¤erent …rm, in order to disentangle a true scarring e¤ect of temporary employment from a cost reduction behaviour of the employers who might be using temporary contracts simply as a cheaper production factor (as discussed in section 2). We focus on two year transitions, as this length of time excludes the e¤ect of stated contract duration for trainees, and more in general it is longer than a screening period of average length.
We expect statistical discrimination to a¤ect transitions across …rms, since a new employer is more likely to have a worse guess about workers'productivity; on the contrary, we will interpret retention under temporary contracts in the same …rm as evidence of a cost reduction behaviour, when lasting over two years. On the other hand, evidence of transitions toward open ended contracts may be interpreted either as a cursus honorum when it occurs within the …rms, or as a more general port of entry when across …rms.
To keep the analysis tractable we exclude individuals who have been apprentices, free-lancers or self employed at least once in the observation period. The last two groups have no …rm coding, so their inclusion would add nothing to the previous analysis; the …rst includes very young individuals on a potentially very long contract, so their exclusion is not too costly. Table 9 presents the results, once again obtained with the …xed e¤ect dynamic multinomial logit model; they can be read as in table 8. There is no evidence of port of entry into a new …rm (col. 1), i.e. having had a temporary job in the past or coming from non work provides the same probability of getting an open ended job in a new …rm. There is only one port of entry across …rms, i.e. having had a long (more than 2 years) open ended employment spell increases signi…cantly the probability of getting an open ended contract in a new …rm with respect to the probability faced by those who were not employed. This may suggest that both the general purpose training and the network building e¤ects mentioned in section 2 are not at work with any temporary contract,or that they fade away quite quickly. On the other hand, persistence in temporary jobs across …rms is not signi…cant (col. 3 and 5, last three rows), hinting that also the scarring e¤ects of temporary contracts are weak or fade away quickly.
However, within …rm patterns are totally di¤erent: both port of entry and contract persistence emerge. Training and -to a slightly lower extent -…xed term contracts help signi…cantly to obtain an open ended contract in the same …rm (signi…cantly positive kj in the last three rows of column 2, Table 9 ). However, the probability of working with a …xed term contract in the same …rm at 24 month distance is higher than the probability to obtain an open ended contract in the same …rm; this is so for those who have worked in the …rm for less as well as for more than 24 months with a …xed term contract, but it is so even for trainees whose most likely outcome is a …xed term contract within the …rm, and not an open ended one ( kj in the last three rows of col. 4 larger than the corresponding kj in col. 2).
Concluding, persistence in temporary jobs occurs within the …rm, meaning that employers use temporary contracts as a cost reduction device, as suggested also by Güell and Petrongolo (2007) . In fact, transitions are computed at intervals larger than the average duration of the contracts and larger than any reasonable screening period (up to 48 months in the …rm); moreover, averaging over the …rst six years of one's career prevents any possible start up period bias.
Claim 4 Temporary jobs do not represent either a scarring event or a port of entry into a new …rm; they are likely to be used as a cost reduction device within the …rm. The port of entry e¤ ect is taken over by an internal cursus honorum e¤ ect.
Conclusions
Are temporary jobs a port of entry toward more stable career patterns, or do they engender a trapping risk into precarious employment? Studying the transitions of an Italian sample of labour market entrants over a long time period, and controlling for workers'sorting across the di¤erent contracts due to unobserved heterogeneity, we have highlighted several aspects of this issue.
First, …xed-term jobs, apprenticeship and training programmes act as a port of entry into open-ended employment -providing a signi…cantly higher probability of obtaining such contract with respect to the one faced by non-working individuals -while freelance contracts don't. We have stressed how di¤erent combinations of EPL provisions, public subsidies, formal training contents and legal bindings may provide …rms with di¤erent incentives to retain workers under temporary contract arrangements as opposed to convert these jobs into open ended positions. Strong SSC rebates, no training requirements and low legal constraints concerning renewals result in a poor port-of-entry performance, as in the case of freelance contracts. Instead, mandatory training and more binding legal constraints on the use, extension and renewals of temporary contracts tend to enhance the probability of getting a standard job, as in the case of the Italian training programmes.
Second, this port-of-entry e¤ect coexist with a trap e¤ect, meaning that even if working is (almost) always better than not working in order to get an open-ended job, the most likely outcome of an employment spell is retaining the same contract. Persistence is therefore substantial too.
A joint interpretation of these two facts becomes easier once a third result is taken into account. After controlling for the identity of the employer, both the port-of-entry and the trap e¤ects are taken over by an internal cursus honorum e¤ect, i.e. a long persistence with temporary contracts within the same …rm possibly followed by an advancement to an open ended contract. The state dependence generated by temporary contracts across …rms fades away within two years, implying that both positive (port of entry) and negative (scarring) e¤ects of these contracts are not permanent. Their lasting e¤ects (positive as well as negative) are …rm speci…c. We interpret these results as evidence of the little general-purpose training received by temporary workers and of a cost-reduction strategy followed by the employers, who retain their employees under a ‡exible arrangement as long as they can and in any case well beyond a reasonable screening period. This view is consistent with open-ended contracts being the only port of entry across di¤erent …rms, another result we obtain in this paper.
By distinguishing among the di¤erent labour market arrangements our analysis has shed further light on the port-of-entry literature: it has intended to demonstrate that it's not just more easily accessible employment spells per se that provide workers with valuable paths to permanent employment, but speci…c combinations of public subsidies, training and legal constraints. By controlling for the identity of the employer we have also shown that more desirable e¤ects (the stepping stone role of temporary jobs) may coexist with less desirable ones (cost reduction strategies and trap e¤ects). In short, we have stressed that the answer to the question posed in the title ultimately depends on two crucial circumstances: the speci…c type of temporary contract one holds and whether the transition between di¤erent contractual arrangements occur within the same employer or across di¤erent employers.
Finally, since having a temporary job is from many perspectives worse than holding an open ended contract, the next question becomes: how long does a worker take to enter an open ended job? And with what welfare cost over her entire career? This involves duration analysis and simulation of welfare levels. We leave this path to our next research.
Appendix: institutional framework and contracts
Our analysis covers the years 1998 -2004, i.e. the period immediately after the ‡exibilization of the Italian labour market was fully implemented. In fact, the period of analysis follows the 1997 "Treu" law that introduced agency contracts, reformed …xed term contracts and apprenticeship, promoted the di¤usion of part time jobs and training contracts and reintroduced probation contracts (tirocinio). Another type of ‡exible jobs, freelance work, had been introduced in the seventies, but strongly promoted only since 1996. The last year in the data is 2004, before another comprehensive reform, the Law 30/2003 ("Legge Biagi"), was actually implemented. So we focus on a period in which legislation on temporary contracts was quite constant (with the exception of 2001 freelance and …xed term contracts'reforms). A brief discussion of the di¤erent features of the various contract types is in order.
-Open ended contracts have no stated duration, no training obligations and no social security rebates. They can be broken through individual or collective layo¤s. Individual layo¤s in Italy are allowed at no cost for just cause only.
14 If a judge rules that the dismissal lacked the ground of just cause, larger …rms (more than …fteen employees) are forced to re-hire the worker and to pay her a compensation; in smaller …rms a severance payment is due. 15 In larger …rms layo¤s occur mainly through collective dismissals, whose access is not di¢ cult.
-Fixed term contracts were introduced in Italy in 1962 but never widely used; collective bargaining allowed their use more and more over the '90s and the 1997 law set an easier access to them for all …rms by law; their almost complete liberalization occurred in 2001. In fact, there is no maximum duration for …xed term contracts but sequences of …xed term contracts within the same …rm are allowed. They provide for no training obligations and no social security rebates.
-Agency contracts were introduced in 1997 and became e¤ective in 1998.For this reason the share of agency workers in our sample -the ‡ow of workers who entered the labor market on 1998 -is very small and we aggregate them to …xed term workers. With agency contracts the provider hires the worker and sends her to the …rm; the …rm pays the wage to the worker (without reductions) and a search cost to the provider. They can last for a maximum of 24 months but are renewable within the same …rm. They provide for no training obligations and no social security rebates. 16 -The training contract was introduced in 1984. It can last a maximum of 24 months and is not renewable within the same …rm. Only individuals under 32 years of age can be hired with this contract. It provides to the …rm from 25% to almost 100% rebate on the Social Security contributions; to the worker a minimum of formal training. 17 -Apprenticeship was introduced in the early Fifties. Apprentices receive a minimum amount of external and on the job training and the employer enjoys a full Social Security contributions rebate. Its maximum duration is 5 years and is not renewable within the same …rm. Only individuals under 24 years of age can be hired with this contract.
-Free-lancers are formally self employed but in most cases their income depends on only one contractor and their tasks are equal to those performed by employees; they are often called quasi-subordinate workers. No training has to be provided by the …rm. Social security contributions are lower than those of dependent workers. When the contract was introduced in 1996 it was for nonmanual jobs only, but this limitation disappeared in 2001. Freelance contracts can be extended and repeated at will.
-Self employed workers observed in WHIP include all professional persons without an autonomous social security fund, as well as artisans and traders. Since they are proper self employees, there's no room for questions about maximum duration, extensions and renewals.
In general, the use of temporary contracts of any kind to substitute workers on strike is forbidden and sequences of temporary contracts face no limits provided the employer is di¤erent. ( * ) A t r a i n i n g c o n t r a c t c a n n o t l a s t m o r e t h a n 2 4 m o n t h s i n t h e s a m e … r m . I t c a n b e o b s e r v e d a s a s p e l l o f 2 5 m o n t h s f o r d a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n r e a s o n s A t r a i n i n g c o n t r a c t c a n n o t l a s t m o r e t h a n 2 4 m o n t h s i n t h e s a m e … r m . I t c a n b e o b s e r v e d a s a s p e l l o f 2 5 m o n t h s f o r d a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n r e a s o n s . H e n c e , d ( t r a i n i n g , t r a i n i n g ) e s t i m a t e s a t t w o y e a r d i s t a n c e a r e n o t t o t a l l y r e l i a b l e . D i s c r e t e t i m e d y n a m i c m u l t i n o m i a l l o g i t w i t h … x e d e ¤ e c t s e s t i m a t e s . S . e . i n s e c o n d r o w s . B o l d i f 9 5 p c t s i g n i … c a n t A t r a i n i n g c o n t r a c t c a n n o t l a s t m o r e t h a n 2 4 m o n t h s i n t h e s a m e … r m . I t c a n b e o b s e r v e d a s a s p e l l o f 2 5 m o n t h s f o r d a t a c o n s t r u c t i o n r e a s o n s . H e n c e , d e l t a ( t r a i n i n g , t r a i n i n g ) e s t i m a t e s a t t w o y e a r d i s t a n c e a r e n o t t o t a l l y r e l i a b l e . S . e . i n s e c o n d r o w s . B o l d i f 9 5 p c t s i g n i … c a n t
